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Abstract
We critique the “college for all” discourse by unveiling its relationship to the politics of education, the
broader economic and political contexts, and the class and race structures embedded in society and
schooling, including higher education. We analyze the current and future labor markets to demonstrate
the ways that the “college for all” discourse overstates the need for math and science knowledge and skills
within the workforce, and we analyze the debt burdens associated with college attendance and completion to demonstrate that the promised benefits of “college for all” are often illusory for low-income,
racially, culturally, and linguistically diverse students. Thus, we argue that “college for all”—just like “no
child left behind” and the “race to the top”—functions as an ideological velvet to soften education policy
talk, talk that actually carries big sticks that punish the very students proclaimed to be the beneficiaries
of the proposed changes in schooling. The results of schooling practices articulated by the “college for
all” discourse are (a) the reinforcement of material barriers to the stated aims of educational access and
equity, and (b) the fortification of the class and race status quo. We examine the ways that the transformation of schooling must be linked to the establishment of just social, economic, and political institutions, and to the formation of a citizenry prepared to engage in the struggles for these institutions.

n “Schooling for Democracy,” Nel Noddings opens
her defense against “losing what might be called the
Whitmanesque vision of democracy—a democracy that
respects every form of honest work, includes people from every
economic and social class, and cultivates a deep understanding of
interdependence” with this question: Should all children go to
college? (2011, p. 1). Noddings intends to criticize the current
dominant discourse about the aims of public schooling and to
foster a reconsideration of its liberal foundations.
We interrogate Noddings’s question and standards for
democracy to clarify their limits and to elaborate a more critical
perspective. We interpret the “college for all” discourse by unveiling
its relationship to the class and race structures at work in schooling,
including higher education, and by situating our critique within a
different vision of democracy and an alternative conception of
citizenship. US policy talk encompasses many variants of the
“college for all” discourse (our February 2011 Google search of the
phrase identified more than one million links); we concentrate on
the main framework of the national debate and some of its backstage realities (Smith, Miller-Kahn, Heinecke, & Jarvis, 2004).
Similarly, we recognize that “college for all” blurs crucially important distinctions among the levels, types, and quality of colleges and
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their outcomes; we always use the phrase with scare quotes to
reinforce our contention that it is precisely this blurring of distinctions that is a key in the ideological force of the discourse.
We proceed in several steps. First, we review the core of
Noddings’s argument and approach to the issues, sketching our
extension of some of her views and critique of others. Second,
we uncover the class and race dimensions of “college for all” and
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position these in relation to current and future labor markets
and in relation to current actual outcomes of postsecondary
schooling. Finally, we outline what can be done in light of the
critical analysis we present. Throughout our discussion, we
demonstrate a contrasting notion of educational philosophy
and challenge the public discourse about the aims of schooling
in a democratic society.

Noddings’s Argument
After asking her core question and declaring her vision of
democracy—one that is respectful of all work, inclusive of all
classes, and recognizing of interdependence—Noddings argues
that the only sensible answer to the opening question is no, not all
children should go to college. Since current policy and practice
neither acknowledge this obvious truth nor embrace Noddings’s
seemingly reasonable vision, her argument is meant to spur corrective action. She develops her position by tracing several 20th-century debates within liberalism about what is required of public
schooling if its graduates are to become good citizens and workers
(leaving aside other possible fundamental aims of schooling).
Noddings notes the slowly forged consensus that a democracy
requires equal schooling at least through high school; this consensus accommodated disagreements about just what equal meant and
entailed, even while high school completion became the pervasive
norm. Disputes concerning completion of what (exactly) and for
what (exactly) were resolved largely through various forms of
tracking—differentiated programs of instruction and schooling
outcomes, that is, academic/college-prep, vocational/industrial, and
commercial. Noddings agrees that comprehensive high schools
must respond to the actual diversity among student capacities,
interests, and skills, and among occupations; she argues that some
form of tracking is necessary, and thus, equal schooling cannot
entail the same curriculum (the academic, college-bound track in
more or less rigorous stratifications) for all students. Further,
Noddings argues that such a differentiated curriculum need not
entail, at least conceptually, an unequal or unjust education, even
for racially and economically disadvantaged students.
Noddings traces our society’s hierarchical ordering of studies
and jobs to classic origins. Ancient thinkers ascribed greater value
to pursuits of intrinsic rather than instrumental worth, culling
aesthetic and ethical reasons to support their hierarchy that made
intellectual work superior to manual work. These frameworks
indeed persist, and Noddings counters their “confusion over the
intellectual” with another branch of the liberal tradition, siding
with John Dewey and Mike Rose, and even calling upon more
radical thinkers such as Paulo Freire and Myles Horton. She
defends the position that “no subject is inherently more intellectual
than another.... If we identify the intellectual with thinking, the
algebra taught in schools is not inherently more intellectual than
cooking or motorcycle repair” (p. 2).
Turning to the economic concerns used to justify the “college
for all” discourse and the purported wage premium a college
education provides, Noddings explores several counterpoints. She
notes that not all college graduates can expect higher lifetime
earnings, and some take many years to move ahead of their less
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credentialed peers. She questions the degree to which our economy
depends on the number of college graduates produced, noting
“prosperous European countries” where “high-quality vocational
education and training are deemed essential” (p. 4). With education and job training shared among government, employers, and
unions, work and active citizenship can be more closely integrated.
These models can be translated to the US context, Noddings
believes, based on an agreement that “we need to educate people
well for the work they do” (p. 4). She urges that we imagine
preparing youths to discern their own callings rather than simply
training them for occupations, and thus we can come closer to her
Whitmanesque vision of democratic schooling.
If schooling is to reach toward democratic equal opportunity,
Noddings is convinced that it cannot be grounded in inert forms of
knowledge, enslaved to false notions of intellectual work that
inappropriately valorize mathematics and science without
conveying their core attribute, critical thinking. Democratic
schools, she argues, must recognize, respect, and appreciate
difference and, above all, demonstrate genuine care and concern
for the human beings who learn and teach in them. With a focus on
guidance of the young toward maturity, rather than on subject
matters and occupations, schools might become the “incubators of
democracy” that so many have hoped they might be (p. 5).

What Is the Question? Which Is the
Vision of Democracy?
There is much to praise in Noddings’s argument; she mines many
rich veins of liberal thought and offers solidly grounded responses
to some central tenets of the dominant discourse of “college for all,”
calling it toward a more reasoned and compassionate form of
schooling that honors the uniqueness of each youth. But it seems to
us that her own analysis and discussion continue to obscure, just as
does the dominant discourse she condemns, the most important
mechanisms at work. We begin by questioning Noddings’s
foundational question, since a more critical point of departure
links these mechanisms in a more revelatory way to broader social,
economic, and political structures, and also enables a more robust
counter-strategy to be developed.
Since no is the obvious and only rational answer to Noddings’s
opening question—“Should all children go to college?”—we seek
our understanding of schooling and democracy in the unveiling of
different questions: Why and how has “college for all” become the
dominant aim of public schooling in the United States (even though
it is clear that not all children can or should go to college)? What
results from this goal’s requirements and logics in relation to the
formation of a democratic society? To what extent do these effects
reinforce (and, in part, produce) the historically embedded ideological structures of class and race (neither of which is addressed as such
by Noddings)? The answers to these questions bring out the
fundamental inequities obscured by the dominant discourse and
school practices, as well as by liberal criticisms of the sort proffered
by Noddings, and they also point toward a fundamentally different
kind of response if schools are to serve democratic purposes.
Similarly, while we agree wholly with the first of Noddings’s
three Whitmanesque standards for democracy—respect for all
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forms of honest work—and with her refusal of the evaluative
hierarchy separating intellectual and manual work and workers, we
do not believe the problem lies in confusions about the nature of
intellectual activity or intrinsic and instrumental values. Instead,
we ask: Since many people from all walks of life have long extolled
the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual value of all forms of honest
work, how and why have the ancient philosophical positions
persisted? How will the answers to these questions recast the
dominant logics of today and indicate more effective forms of
engagement so as to overcome them? We suggest that it is not
coincidental that classical philosophers elaborated a view that gave
succor and sustenance to the ruling class, as it continues to do. In
other words, forms of work are saturated with class and status
markers that materialize unearned privileges (or undeserved disadvantages) and moral stature (or moral approbation), and this
saturation is not secondary to but constitutive of social, economic,
and political relationships. Since history shows that concerted
struggle by the disadvantaged and demeaned is necessary to alter
these valuations and privileges, both philosophic critique and
democratic schooling practices can only achieve their aims if they
help prepare the relevant populations for these very struggles.
Further, we might also ask: Do the “college for all” discourse and
associated school practices actually require class, require race, to
exist as they do? If buried within these dominant ideological logics
are the ranking and sorting mechanisms of the foundational myth
of individual meritocratic achievement—a (if not the) primordial
reason for public schooling within capitalist societies—what might
this tell us about the limits of any reform that leaves the “grammar
of schooling” intact (Tyack & Cuban, 1995)? We detect a related
point in Noddings’s discussion of some European countries’
differentiation of vocational and university education: she passes in
silence over how these schooling systems leave their country’s core
social, economic, and political inequities intact, despite their
inclusive partnerships among employers, unions, and governments, and despite their recognition of the value of diverse
occupations.
Continuing this line of reasoning, we notice that Noddings’s
second Whitmanesque standard—that a democracy “includes
people from every economic and social class” (p. 1)—accepts as
given the economic and social class structure and calls only for
inclusion. This position assumes that economic and social classes
can be somehow separated from the inequitable valuations, power,
and social and political relations that make them what they are. We
believe that economic and social classes, even at the conceptual
level, necessarily bear the marks and dynamics of injustice. This is
not to suggest that individual members of antagonistic economic
and social classes cannot live and work in solidarity across these
divides; rather, we want to emphasize that the very existence of
these classes as classes is only possible in terms of conflicting
interests and differential valuations and power. We therefore think
democratic schooling should strive not toward class inclusiveness,
but toward the abolition of classes as such and the formation of
equitable social, economic, and political institutions that truly treat
all forms of honest work with equal respect. In this regard, we
might note that Walt Whitman, though a known abolitionist in
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regard to slavery, is reported to have feared the abolitionist
movement; the fear of that kind of struggle for change haunts
liberal views, and perhaps a similar reservation lies beneath the
position advanced by Noddings.
As our questions and critiques of Noddings’s question and
vision indicate, we believe that a philosophical analysis of “college
for all” must follow a more materialist line of inquiry if it is to
provide the kind of insight that can ground transformative changes
in school policies and practices. In the sections that follow, we
continue to pursue just such a line.

Deconstructing the Discourse of “College for All”
A broad bipartisan public discourse about the purpose and
potential of schooling in a dynamically changing globalized
economy has become codified in the aim of “college for all.” This
discourse—articulating the world as it is; as it has been; and as it
might, could, or should become (Fairclough, 2001)—echoes and
synthesizes disparate strands in educational thought and politics. It
has achieved near taken-for-granted status within education policy,
practice, and research worlds. It reiterates familiar representations
of schooling’s role in economic progress and competitiveness but
also incorporates two other powerful discursive strands: calls for
greater equity and for opportunities for upward social mobility. The
“college for all” discourse portrays a future in which equity,
excellence, and international competitiveness are interwoven into a
compelling narrative of progress—both individual and collective.
This framing enticingly binds social and economic classes together
in a seamless prosperous future in which everyone is better off than
he or she otherwise would be.
“College for all” emerged as an organizing framework for
21st-century public schooling following the Reagan administration’s 1983 Nation at Risk call to educational arms, which situated
schooling as the lever to move workforce preparation to the front in
the era’s rapidly globalizing economic competition. Unlike the
rhetoric of the movement for standards, testing, and accountability
that was galvanized by the alleged “rising tide of mediocrity”
engulfing the nation’s schools, “college for all” resonated with the
deeply egalitarian and democratic aspirations for public schooling
that have attracted a broad base of the citizenry since the time of
Horace Mann. This enabled the conservative movement to position
itself as a champion of improved schooling for the poor—without
giving ground on its strategic aims of restructuring the curriculum
to meet the needs of global capitalism and of privatizing public
schooling through vouchers, charters, and other market-based
mechanisms. Conservatives argued that high standards and high
expectations for all students demanded the preparation of every
able and willing student to enter postsecondary schooling, and that
the global marketplace demanded that US students be pushed to
ever higher levels of literacy and numeracy. These college-going
skills for all students (future workers) were supposedly necessary to
maintain the country’s scientific and technological advantages,
which fuel its profit engines.
Youths who succeeded in their rigorous K–12 preparation
would have the opportunity to attend college, and success there
would gain them access to good jobs that drew upon their advanced
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literacy and numeracy skills; this vision was meant to motivate
students to study hard and persist to graduation. Even previously
left behind low-income, racially, culturally, and linguistically
diverse (LI/RCLD) students would gain entrance into the middle
class and the global economy. This schooling trajectory toward
rewarding employment was meant to parallel a political trajectory
toward a form of citizenship that would renew and strengthen
democratic traditions and institutions; well-educated and wellemployed citizens could look forward to reduced social, economic,
and political inequalities. More pointedly, the claim was made that
reducing the test-score and college-attendance gaps among classes
and races would enable more LI/RCLD students to enjoy the
educational and employment privileges of the middle class that
had long eluded them (as if their own efforts were the sole driver of
their achievement), thus finally realizing the utopian promise of
public schooling. For conservatives, “college for all” not only
justifies their calls for tougher standards and testing and more
accountability, it fulfills their pursuit of goodness by not leaving
any child behind.
Though it emanated from conservative intellectual and
political centers, this discourse soon was given voice by a strikingly
wide array of politicians, educators, commentators, and activists.
Moderates, liberals, and progressives found themselves in a
difficult position; they could not deny the shameful outcomes in
schools in low-income neighborhoods, the importance of clear
standards and high expectations, and that major changes were
needed to provide meaningful economic opportunities for the
students in those neighborhoods. Embracing the goals seemed to
leave them little room to challenge either the means for attaining
the goals or the underlying logics that defined them. For liberals
and progressives, then and now, “college for all” appeals to the
long-standing struggle for higher expectations and more rigorous
curricula for LI/RCLD students to insure their greater educational
and economic access; moreover, this discourse appears to hold the
ground being lost to the voter initiatives and court actions that are
rolling back the gains of the civil rights movement and affirmative
action policies.
However, a deeper analysis reveals that “college for all” unites
social actors across the political spectrum only by incorporating
liberal ideals of equity into the logic of neoliberalism (the primacy
of individual self-interest, markets, and profits), and by representing the global changes driven by advanced capitalism as inevitable
facts that require individuals to adjust to them, rather than as
contested realities open to alternative interpretations and futures
(Burbules & Torres, 2000; Lipman, 2004). The conservative agenda
becomes reinforced and the liberal agenda becomes another dream
deferred for LI/RCLD students; “college for all” provides an
ideological velvet to soften the education policy talk that actually
carries big sticks that punish the very students proclaimed to be the
beneficiaries of the changes in policy and practice. These changes
reinforce material barriers to public schooling’s stated aims of
access and equity, and misrepresent the nature of the future
workforce. Perhaps the most pernicious consequence of the logics
of schooling and neoliberalism is that students are induced to
accept their standardized testing performance and academic rank
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as measures of their personal worth and their right to participate in
the shaping of society.
History shows that, despite vastly expanded access to postsecondary schooling for the working class (following the WWII GI
Bill) and people of color (following Brown v. Board of Education,
the civil rights movement, and the passage of affirmative action
legislation), the basic economic, social, and political divisions and
inequities among classes and races remain structurally dominant,
even within the college-going population itself. Such disjunctures
between the “college for all” narrative and the material realities of
the persistent educational and economic inequalities that maintain
and harden the status quo (Carnoy, 1994) mean that the “college for
all” discourse hides and reinforces the very mechanisms producing
the results it claims to be remedying. For example, more young
people from all three major racial and ethnic groups attend and
graduate from college today than ever before, and the proportions
are expected to continue rising, yet racial disparities remain and
widen, and income inequality continues to grow (Aud, Fox, &
KewalRamani, 2010). Additionally, the college participation rate of
low-income students (whose families earn less than $25,000 per
year) remains 32% behind high-income students (whose families
earn more than $75,000 per year)—just as it was 30 years earlier
(Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 2001).
Thus, existing patterns of class and race inequality, as measured by level of educational attainment, remain firmly intact even
as more and more students from all social groups are attending
college. It is important to note that these figures only measure
attendance rates at public and private four-year institutions, but
they do not disaggregate by level of college selectivity and prestige,
and thus they obscure other stratified disparities. In fact, at the
more elite universities, despite significantly expanded financial aid,
the percentage of students from families in the bottom quartile of
national family income is only about 3% (Fischer, 2006).1 At the
same time, students from the top income quartile in elite colleges
have risen to constitute half of the enrollment (Bowen et al., 2005).
Moreover, the consistent growth in college-going rates across all
social groups has done little to stem the larger national trend of
increasing wealth and income inequality. In recent years, overall
wages have continued to fall even as profits and productivity have
grown to new heights, and the United States remains the most
unequal society in the developed world despite having one of the
largest proportions of young adults who attend at least some
college (Mishel, Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2006).

Centering Class and Race in the
Discussion of “College for All”
Reality of the Labor Market

In earlier eras, LI/RCLD students were tracked into vocational
programs and steered toward blue-collar jobs in a variety of
skilled trades.2 Today, many of these pathways into middleincome jobs are vanishing, and a college degree is increasingly
necessary (but not sufficient) to obtain middle-income, full-time,
stable employment.3
On average, college graduates earn nearly double the wages of
high school graduates (Bergman, 2005), and this gap has grown
article response

4

since 1980 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010). Yet a
closer examination reveals that some of the promised advantages
may be illusory, since the averages conceal important exceptions
within different groups, and the college wage premium is bolstered
by the earnings of a concentrated few at the top of the income
spectrum (Mishel et al., 2006). In fact, there is greater income
inequality within the college-educated group than between
college-educated and non-college-educated workers (Katz & Autor,
2005), and one out of six college graduates earns less than the
average wage of high school graduates (Lafer, 2002). This makes
clear that not all colleges uniformly deliver earnings benefits, but
this crucially important reality is completely eclipsed in the “college
for all” discourse that conflates all colleges. Moreover, the average
earnings of college graduates fell by 5.4% between 2000 and 2004
(Hennessy-Fiske, 2006); this was the first time in thirty years that
college-educated workers’ earnings fell at all, and their earnings
continued to fall again in 2005 (Dube & Graham-Squire, 2006).
Thus, while a college degree offers one possible route to upward
social mobility (among a dwindling number of alternative options),
the “college for all” ideology promotes a mistaken over-optimism
about the power of college to provide mobility for LI/RLCD
students in general.
It is also worth noting that the US Department of Labor
estimates that only about 30% of new jobs created in the next ten
years will require a college degree (Hecker, 2005), roughly the
percentage of the population currently completing college.
Although this new-jobs figure has been contested (Tyler, Murnane,
& Levy, 1995), there is substantial evidence that the widely assumed
need for more college graduates is overstated and does not reflect
the needs expressed by employers (Anyon, 2005; Grubb &
Lazerson, 2004; Handel, 2005; Lafer, 2002; Mishel et al., 2006;
Rosenbaum, 2001). A review of six recent studies by federal
agencies and independent scholars found that the largest number
of jobs will not particularly require the advanced skills allegedly
acquired in college, even when college completion is prominent
within a specific sector of the work force (Hacker, 2011). The ten
occupations with the greatest growth in the 2008–2018 period will
be in the following sectors: food preparers and servers, customer
service representatives, long-haul truck drivers, nursing aides and
orderlies, receptionists, security guards, construction laborers,
landscapers and groundskeepers, home health aides, and licensed
practical nurses. Yet in 2006, in a strong economy quite unlike the
present one, “the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 17% of
bartenders had completed college, as had 32% of massage therapists
and 26% of fashion models” and another study predicted that 22%
of floral designers and 18% of fast-food cooks in 2018 will have at
least a bachelor’s degree (Hacker, 2011, p. 41).
Further analysis of the labor market demonstrates that the
need for knowledge and skills in mathematics is overemphasized.
Astonishingly, a survey of high-tech employers found that they do
not place mathematical knowledge in the top-ten skills they deem
most important; even among recruited engineering and computer
science students, few need more than eighth-grade mathematics in
their jobs (Hacker, 2011, p. 40). It turns out that employers are
looking for workers with good character, and assume that they can
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teach workers necessary skills. The fact is that the growth of
high-skill jobs in high-tech industries does not amount to a large
absolute number of jobs, and even now the US science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce “amounts to less
than a third” of the workers who already hold at least one STEM
degree (Hacker, 2011, p. 40).

Debt Load

These labor market realities are an even greater concern when we
consider the alarming debt burden that LI/RCLD students acquire
while pursuing their college educations and the often mythic wage
and job premium promised in the “college for all” discourse. In the
last decade, the cost of higher education has increased faster than
the rate of inflation and the median income (Aud, et al., 2010).4
Meanwhile, federal Pell grants (the primary form of government
financial aid that students do not need to pay back) have failed to
keep pace: the purchasing power of the maximum Pell grant fell
from 84% of tuition costs in 1975 to 39% in 2002 (King & Bannon,
2002). Consequently, more students are depending on loans and
borrowing in greater amounts (Wirt, et al., 2004b). Today approximately two-thirds of college graduates have some student loan
debt, and those most likely to carry debt are students who are also
low-income, African American, and/or Latina/o (King & Bannon,
2002).5 While many carry relatively minor student debt, those most
in need of the college wage premium actually graduate with the
most debt: further, over half of African American (55%) and
Latina/o (58%) borrowers carry “unmanageable” student debt,
defined by the loan industry as monthly payments that exceed 8%
of monthly income before taxes (King & Bannon, 2002). These
figures include nearly half of African American and one-third of
Latina/o college graduates who carry unmanageable student debt,
and their economic condition is further exacerbated by the fact that
they earn less than White college graduates (King & Bannon, 2002).
The impact of rising tuitions and debt burdens needs to be
contextualized within three additional observations. First, LI/
RCLD students are more likely to borrow, and to borrow in greater
amounts, than their higher-income peers, while at the same time
they are less likely to get help from their families to pay off their
loans and often have financial responsibilities to their families
while in school and after graduating (Choy & Li, 2005; King &
Bannon, 2002). Thus, the figures actually underestimate their true
student debt “burden.” Second, although college is more expensive
for everyone, changes to the structure of financial aid since the
1990s have actually benefited students from high-income families
(Wirt, et al., 2004b).6 Further, the growth in merit-based aid (which
reinforce the advantages possessed by upper-income students) has
exceeded the growth in need-based grants (which benefit lowerincome students), even though upper-income families are the only
group for whom rising annual income is actually outpacing the rise
in college tuition (Fitzgerald, 2003). Third, our analysis underaccounts for the many LI/RCLD students who borrow but never
graduate. If we consider the proportions of LI/RCLD graduates
with “unmanageable” student debt in conjunction with the college
persistence rates for these same groups, we can begin to see the true
scale of the problem. For example, of students who entered
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four-year postsecondary institutions in 2004 with a bachelor’s
degree goal, just 50.5% had graduated by 2009, with substantially
lower proportions for LI/RCLD students: 40.8% for low-income
students (those whose families earned less than $32,000 in 2002);
34.8% for African Americans; 36.1% for Latina/os; and only 36.4%
for first-generation college students, which may be the most
accurate indicator of social class from these choices (Radford,
Berkner, Wheeless, & Shepherd, 2010). One study of the debt
burden of postsecondary “noncompleters,” those students who had
not graduated five years after enrolling in a four-year postsecondary institution, reports that 19% carried student debt, and their
monthly payments averaged 8.6% of their salary, an “unmanageable” level (US Department of Education, 1999). This study did not
break the figures down by race, ethnicity, or class. Given the
patterns in borrowing and college completion rates that we have
summarized above, we can expect that a disproportionate number
of young adults carrying heavy student debts without a college
degree are likely to be low-income and/or African American or
Latina/o. These disturbing patterns are omitted in the “college for
all” discourse.

What Should Be Done?
Given the analyses that center class and race in the “college for all”
discourse, what should be done? We find ourselves in strong
agreement with Noddings’s calls to place individualized counseling
at the core of schooling,7 and to make respect and support for
differences pillars of a lifelong learning approach.
But much more is needed for an adequate strategic response.
The images of “getting ahead” and “moving up” exert powerful
influences on LI/RCD students, as well as on their teachers, who
must work to create “exceptions”—students who beat the odds and
make it to college after all (Bettie, 2003; Nygreen, forthcoming).
Some exceptional students do emerge and their “success” is
publicly celebrated—within symbolic frames reiterating the
emblematic Horatio Alger myth of American individualism, the
virtue of personal effort and the promise of schooling’s meritocracy. Again passed over in silence are all of those inevitable
nonexceptions for whom the dominant discourse offers no
compelling purpose of schooling, even at schools where college is
factually out of reach for nearly every student. Caught up in the
meritocratic myth, such students are likely to blame themselves,
not social structures, for their lack of success and upward mobility
(Brint & Karabel, 1989; Fine, 1991; Nygreen, forthcoming). These
foundational myths of public schooling and the student selfunderstandings induced by them are reinforced by the “college for
all” discourse, and they are potent elements in the legitimation of
the dominant class and race orders of the status quo.
Thus, when we consider what is to be done in the current
discursive context, we need not only to reconstruct the curricula
and operations of schooling but also to deconstruct the myths that
have long captured the public imagination. This means naming
and studying the classed and raced realities of schools and society
so that effective transformative interventions can be acted upon
through engaged citizenship. Certainly effective individual
counseling must support the full development of youths as people,
democracy & education, vol 19, n-o 1

citizens, and workers, but, in addition, it must unveil both the
ideological framing of forms of labor and the structural inequities
in the labor market. Another primary task must be to reveal the
ranking and sorting mechanisms of K–12 and postsecondary
schooling. These mechanisms operate to obscure the structural
dis/advantages bestowed by class and race in the delivery and
outcomes of schooling at all levels, and therefore simultaneously
reinforce and legitimate the class and racial status quo.
At the same time, we must build compelling counter-narratives
that articulate conceptions of schooling for the common good and
personal well-being and that embrace a broader set of aims for
schooling and a deeper understanding of what matters most in living
healthy, fulfilled, productive lives. If we define the purpose of
education as improving the life chances and quality of life for all
students—including those most marginalized within existing social
structures—then schooling must aim to facilitate collective, and not
only individual, agency. While each and every young person should
be encouraged and prepared to develop her or his academic and
intellectual skills to their highest capacity, the transformation of the
material conditions of class and race inequities has not been, and
cannot be, achieved through gains that accrue to individuals alone;
history demonstrates that the lives of LI/RCLD students as a group
have been altered little by expanding access to postsecondary
education. Even for many individuals, as we have argued, the gains
have often been illusory. Schooling in general and “college for all” in
particular do not address the fundamental structural issues related
to the nature of global capitalism, which requires many minimally
educated, unskilled workers; nor do they address the fundamental
structural issues related to the class and race hierarchies that shape
the social, cultural, and political realms. The individual pursuit of
educational credentials as a response to falling wages, the loss of
manufacturing jobs and other avenues to middle-income careers,
and the demands of certain leading sectors of the economy cannot
substitute for the collective organization for political and economic
changes that can secure for workers an equitable share of the
enormous profits they generate. Similarly, the ascension of individual, talented LI/RCLD students to positions of leadership in politics,
science, the arts and entertainment, and the economy cannot
substitute for the collective efforts necessary to end the privileges of
class and race and enable truly equal opportunities for all.
Within schools themselves, it should be possible to make
changes in the near term that move significantly toward the
honoring of all forms of honest work that Noddings and we agree
is needed. The overemphasis on STEM curricula, and the
demand that all students be measured almost singly in relation to
their performance on tests associated with those curricula, can be
abandoned, and the full range of curricular and career options
can be reinvigorated. Authentic forms of assessment in relation
to student-chosen academic and career goals can be developed,
and students can pursue their life choices without being
demeaned or reduced to “nobodies” without value to the school
or community (Glass, 2009). Schools can become nodes in
broader associations of public and private organizations, using
the full social and cultural resources of cities and towns; schools
also can establish work-linked and apprenticeship-learning
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opportunities along the lines of a number of advanced industrial
European countries and provide students with ways to become
engaged in meaningful productive work.9 Employers in the
United States are already spending over $400 billion annually on
formal and informal education in the workplace (Harvard
Graduate School of Education, 2011), so making these changes
need not require more funds but rather only the coordination of
the learning opportunities.
In sum, recognizing the way in which the “college for all”
discourse maintains and reinforces long-standing class- and
race-based structural inequities, and recognizing that this discourse is articulated with powerful economic and political interests
opposed to true equity of opportunity, there is no choice but to
pursue the reconstruction of schools as part of a larger project of
social, cultural, economic, and political reconstruction. The
democratic project for schools is integral to the democratic project
for civil society and governance, so schools must actively enable LI/
RCLD students to be citizens prepared for the intense struggles
necessary to overcome the structural inequities limiting their lives.
We do not have the lyric voice of Whitman to close our
analysis, but we have an arresting vision to counter the currently
fashionable “race to the top” permutation of the “college for all”
discourse. We need to ask: Why a race, which always has winners
and losers? Why the rush to the top, where only one or few can
stand, necessarily with the many on the bottom? Perhaps recalling a different race to the top will provide a cautionary pause, so
we can reconsider where we are going and whether we want to
race at all. In the Nazi gas chambers, the dominant among the
doomed would rush to the locked doors, seeking an escape from
the steadily rising deadly poison, and there they pushed, shoved,
hit, and clawed their way to the top of the pile of bodies, smashing
beneath them the old and infirm, the children, and any who kept
them from being the last to take a breath, the winners of that
particular race to the top. We need to recall that in some races, all
are losers, wherever in the hierarchy they end up. Schools and the
current dominant discourses of schooling surely continue to leave
at the bottom the majority of LI/RCLD students, and even those
who make it to the top may still have a sealed doom. We seek a
different vision, one of mutual beneficence, of solidarity in the
meeting of human needs, not greeds. We seek others to join in a
struggle to end the race to the top in favor of the building of a just
society whose institutions serve the common good and enable
each of us to realize her or his fullest potential.

Notes
1. The sample was the “top 146 colleges” as reported in the Chronicle
of Higher Education. Further, only 3% of students at 19 highly
selective colleges and leading state universities are the first to attend
college from a low-income family (Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin,
2005).
2. Such systems of so-called ability tracking have been, and remain,
wrought with class and race bias (see Oakes, 1985). We do not wish
to romanticize or advocate for a return to such classist and racist
vocational tracking systems.
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3. Economic shifts associated with globalization and the postindustrial economy include: The decline of the manufacturing
sector (deindustrialization); the weakening of labor unions; the
reduction in the purchasing power of wages; the growing polarization of income distribution between the top and bottom ends
of the labor market; the increasing use of part-time, temporary,
and contingent labor; and the job growth in retail and servicesector work that tends to be nonunion and poorly paid. Together,
these changes have weakened or eliminated many of the pathways
through which some non-college-educated workers previously
obtained full-time, middle-income, and stable working-class
employment (Tannock, 2003).
4. For example: Between 1981 and 2000, average college tuition
doubled while median family income grew only by 27% (NCES
.ed.gov/das/epubs/2002174).
5. Low-income is defined as students from families earning less
than $20,000/year in 2002; King & Bannon (2002) found that 71%
of low-income students, 84% of African American students, and
66% of Latina/o students graduated with educational debt.
6. These changes include increased loan limits, extended eligibility
for subsidized loans to middle- and high-income students, and the
introduction of unsubsidized loans regardless of income.
7. Without question, the current approach to counseling is woefully
inadequate, with often 500:1 ratios in high schools and 1000:1 ratios
in community colleges (Harvard Graduate School of Education,
2011, p. 26). This reflects another structural disadvantage for LI/
RCLD students who may lack the social and cultural capital to get
such support outside of formal school settings.
8. As we noted earlier in discussing Noddings’ invocation of such
programs, they should be developed in conjunction with focused
efforts to deconstruct class and race hierarchies.
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